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Summary This paper theoretically and empirically connects the literature on high-reliability organiza-
tions (HROs) to a broader set of organizations, which we call reliability-seeking organizations.
Unlike HROs, which operate high-hazard technologies, reliability-seeking organizations oper-
ate in high-hazard environments. Reliability-seeking organizations are tightly coupled to their
unpredictable and complex environments in such a manner that although the human mortality
rate is low, the risk of small failures amplifying into organizational mortality is high. To cope
with these environments, reliability-seeking organizations organize to remain open and flexible
to emerging information and achieve the reliability demanded by their environments—
intensity of innovation. These organizations utilize skilled temporary employees, positive
employee relations, and an emphasis on training to innovate, and, in turn, generate greater
financial performance. We test these hypotheses using a sample of 184 initial public offering
(IPO) software firms that conducted their IPO between 1993 and 1996 and our results are con-
sistent with our theorizing. Firms that utilized these human resource practices innovated more
frequently and firms with more innovations had higher stock prices over time. Our findings
combine to suggest a theoretical model of structural antecedents of a different type of reliabil-
ity—intensity of innovation. Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Introduction
High-reliability organizations (HROs, e.g., nuclear power plants, nuclear aircraft carriers, and air traf-
fic control) have often been characterized as too special, too exotic, and too ‘far out’ for the prosaic
world of everyday organizations (Scott, 1994) and mainstream organization theory (LaPorte &
Consolini, 1991). Simultaneously and paradoxically, they have also been hailed as a source of valuable
lessons for how all organizations can minimize error and handle peak demands (LaPorte, 1996) and as
‘harbingers of adaptive organizational forms for an increasingly complex environment’ (Weick,
Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 1999, p. 82). In this study we attempt to answer two questions that emerge from
this paradox: Under what conditions do ‘prosaic’ organizations resemble ‘exotic’ HROs? Given a
general resemblance, how do firms organize to replicate the exceptional performance of HROs?
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HROs are defined by their unique ability to operate high-hazard technological systems in a nearly
error-free manner (Roberts, 1990). These organizations are constantly at risk of failure because their
technologies are so complex that elements can combine in unforeseen ways and when errors occur they
amplify rapidly because of tight coupling (Perrow, 1999). While ordinary organizations rarely operate
such hazardous technologies, in many industries (e.g., software) or in an early stage of an organiza-
tional life cycle (e.g., IPO), some organizations find themselves in complex, rapidly changing, and
tightly coupled organization–environment relations. When they face such environments these organi-
zations become ‘reliability seeking.’ However, it is important to note that the reliability these organi-
zations seek differs somewhat from that of HROs. While reliability entails an ‘unusual capacity to
produce collective outcomes of a certain minimum quality repeatedly’ (Hannan & Freeman, 1984,
p. 153) in both settings, in tightly coupled and interactively complex organization–environment rela-
tions, reliability manifests itself as the capability to stay ahead of competitors and technological obso-
lescence through greater intensity of innovation (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; D’Aveni, 1994).
Scholars have argued that reliability-seeking organizations address the tight coupling and interactive
complexity of their organization–environment relations through mindfulness (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001;
Weick et al., 1999). Mindfulness is appropriate for reliability-seeking organizations because it ‘both
increases the comprehension of complexity and loosens tight coupling’ (Weick et al., 1999, p. 105)
and encourages organizations to constantly probe their environments for ways to stay ahead through
innovation (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). We argue that mindfulness occurs as a byproduct of a set of
human resource (HR) practices that help an organization remain vigilant and flexible. Specifically, HR
practices that help infuse divergent perspectives (the use of skilled temporary employees), enable and
increase bidirectional communication (positive employee relations), and recognize the need for updating
skills and building new capabilities (an emphasis on training) should assist reliability-seeking organiza-
tions in their efforts to innovate.
In this study we examine a cohort of reliability-seeking firms, specifically software firms that con-
ducted their initial public offerings (IPOs) between 1993 and 1996. The crux of our argument is that
IPO software firms face environments that are interactively complex and to which they are tightly
coupled, and, as a consequence, are reliability seeking. After establishing IPO software firms as relia-
bility seeking we offer a conceptual framework for how these firms achieve innovation. To do so, we
revisit and elaborate the concept of mindfulness, articulate the cognitive processes that underlie it, and
theoretically connect mindfulness with human resource practices. Next we derive hypotheses articulat-
ing the relationship between use of skilled temporary employees, positive employee relations, and an
emphasis on training and innovation. Finally we test our hypotheses using a sample of 184 IPO software
firms and offer implications for HROs, mindfulness, and strategic human resource management.
IPO Software Firms as Reliability-Seeking Organizations
HROs need to maintain failure-free operations because their technologies are sufficiently hazardous
that the first error can be the last trial. Two characteristics of these technologies make untoward out-
comes both likely and disastrous: tight coupling and interactive complexity (Perrow, 1999). A system
is tightly coupled when the component parts are interrelated in such a manner that there are few pos-
sible substitutions, time-dependent processes, and minimal slack and buffers (Perrow, 1999). A system
is interactively complex when it is extremely difficult to anticipate all the ways in which the different
components of a system will interact. Interactive complexity also increases the likelihood that when
interactions do occur they will be unfamiliar or unexpected sequences that are not immediately com-
prehensible (Perrow, 1999, p. 78).
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While few organizations operate technologies as hazardous as those of HROs, we argue that a wider
variety of organizations face conditions of tight coupling and interactive complexity in their organiza-
tion–environment relations. To the extent that an organization is tightly coupled to an interactively
complex environment, it becomes reliability seeking to avert the extreme risk and consequences of
error inherent in such environments. These organizations seek greater intensity of innovation to cope
with their demanding environments because ‘failure to keep up is not met with leniency,’ but rather
with involuntary exit (D’Aveni, 1994, p. 217).
There are three sources of tight coupling in organization–environment relations that mirror the fea-
tures identified by Perrow: resource dependence (limited substitutions), time pressure (time-dependent
processes), and the liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965; minimal slack). The resource dependence
perspective (Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976) asserts that organizations are incapable of generating all the
resources necessary to maintain themselves and therefore must enter into exchanges with other orga-
nizations (i.e., the environment). To the extent that a firm is heavily reliant upon a single customer,
partner, or supplier it creates tight coupling and minimizes possible substitutions for the provision
of key resources in the event of a customer, partner, or supplier failing. The literature on high-velocity
environments (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988) illustrates how time-dependent
processes occur in organization–environment relations. Time-dependent processes in these settings are
rapidly opening and closing niches and ‘strategic windows’ which once missed often result in invo-
luntary exit (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988). Lastly, the liability of newness asserts that young orga-
nizations are at the greatest risk of failure because they have extremely limited resources and slack that
make them vulnerable to even slight errors or disruptions (Stinchcombe, 1965).
IPO software firms face each of these conditions of tight coupling. First, these firms are often heavily
reliant upon one customer, supplier, or strategic partner, which limits substitutions and creates resource
dependence. Second, the environments facing IPO software firms closely mirror the time dependence of
high-velocity environments described by Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988). IPO software firms face the
constant threat of intense competition and technological obsolescence that necessitates swift and greater
intensity of innovation. Lastly, IPO software firms face the liability of newness and the limited slack that
accompanies it, as the vast majority of these firms tend to be young, small, and cash poor.
The presence of interactive complexity, unexpected and unfamiliar sequences, and incomprehensi-
ble interactions in organization–environment relations is well documented in prior research on hyper-
competition (D’Aveni, 1994) and high-velocity environments (Eisenhardt, 1989; Bourgeois &
Eisenhardt, 1988). Hypercompetition erodes environmental stability and creates interactive complex-
ity through shortening product life cycles, repeatedly introducing new technologies, frequent entry by
unexpected outsiders, repositioning by incumbents, and radical redefinitions of market boundaries as
diverse industries merge (D’Aveni, 1994). High-velocity environments are those in which there is
‘rapid and discontinuous change in demand, competitors, technology and/or regulation, such that
information is often inaccurate, unavailable, or obsolete’ (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988, p. 816).
These conditions are important to our current discussion because they make it especially difficult to
predict the significance of a change as it is occurring. That is, high-velocity conditions create the unfa-
miliar and the incomprehensible.
The environment facing IPO software firms is interactively complex, hypercompetitive, and high
velocity. The complexity results from rapid and discontinuous technological change and the erosion
of traditional market boundaries and categories. For example, consider some of the significant
technological advances that have occurred during the period under study (1993–1999): multimedia,
Internet, LAN-based networks, and the JAVA programming language to name just a few (Bogner &
Barr, 2000; Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). At the same time market boundaries were being blurred as
software began its convergence with telecommunications and consumer electronics. In sum, both
hypercompetition and high-velocity environments increase the potential for the unexpected and the
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unfamiliar because change is rapid, endemic, and discontinuous, and boundaries are permeable and
ever shifting. Under such circumstances, it is impossible to anticipate future technological or compe-
titive landscapes.
While their environments may be impossible to anticipate due to interactive complexity, reliability-
seeking organizations cannot simply utilize a ‘wait and see’ strategy because it may also result in fail-
ure, as competitive positions change and windows of opportunity close. Therefore, reliability-seeking
organizations attempt to navigate their treacherous environments through tactics that help them to con-
stantly probe their environments for ways to stay ahead through innovation. One strategy for coping
with tightly coupled and interactively complex organization–environment relations is through pursu-
ing a strategy of continuous change that not only reacts to the environment, but also enacts and creates
it through innovation (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997). D’Aveni (1994) similarly advocates a proactive
strategy of hypercompetitive behavior whereby firms utilize innovation to actively shape their envir-
onments and continuously generate new competitive advantages and destroy, obsolete, or neutralize
the opponent’s competitive advantage. In the next section, we build on this analysis and hypothesize
how three HR practices (use of skilled temporary employees, positive employee relations, and an
emphasis on training) work through three underlying mechanisms (reluctance to simplify interpreta-
tions, sensitivity to operations, and commitment to resilience) to help reliability-seeking organizations
stay ahead through innovation.
Theory and Hypotheses
Mindfulness1
The theoretical mechanisms underlying the proposed relationship between HR practices and innovation
are mindfulness and its constituent processes. Mindfulness entails an ‘enriched awareness . . . [through]
active differentiation and refinement of existing categories and distinctions . . . creation of new discon-
tinuous categories out of the continuous stream of events . . . and a more nuanced appreciation of context
and alternative ways to deal with it’ (Weick et al., 1999, p. 90). We choose mindfulness for three reasons.
First, mindfulness has been proposed as a concept to bridge HROs and other reliability-seeking organi-
zations because reliability in both settings is theorized to emerge from ‘the input side: what they pay
attention to, how they process it, and how they struggle to maintain continuing alertness’ (Weick &
Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 19). Second, mindfulness is of critical importance to reliability-seeking organizations
as it allows them to more readily detect weak signals from interactively complex environments earlier
and respond to them more effectively. Mindfulness also loosens tight coupling by creating alternative
paths of action. Lastly, mindfulness should also enhance a firm’s ability to innovate because ‘creating
new categories, exploring multiple perspectives, and focusing on process all increase the possibility that
a novel approach to a problem will be discovered’ (Langer, 1989, p. 139).
In their elaboration of the processes of collective mindfulness Weick and colleagues (Weick &
Sutcliffe, 2001; Weick et al., 1999) identify five processes that contribute to creating and sustaining
the enriched awareness of mindfulness: reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to operations,
commitment to resilience, underspecification of structures, and preoccupation with failure. Reluctance
to simplify interpretations entails seeking out and maintaining divergent viewpoints and skepticism to
1When we refer to mindfulness, we are referring to it at the system or organization level (i.e., collective mindfulness, Weick et al.,
1999). To the extent we invoke Langer’s work (1989, 1997), which was derived from work on individuals, we focus on her
references to the group or organizational level of analysis.
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minimize blind spots and ensure key variables are not overlooked. Sensitivity to operations means creat-
ing and maintaining an integrated big picture of the moment through ongoing attention to real-time
information (Weick et al., 1999). Commitment to resilience is the belief in the fallibility of existing
knowledge as well as the ability to both bounce back from errors and handle surprises in the moment
(Wildavsky, 1988). The underspecification of structures results from the fluid decision-making that
occurs in HROs during high-tempo times. During these periods, decisions migrate to the individuals
in the organization with the greatest expertise and closest to the problem (Roberts, Stout, & Halpern,
1994). Lastly, organizations preoccupied with failure treat any failure or near miss as an indicator of the
reliability and health of the system and reward the reporting of errors (Weick et al., 1999).
In this study we theorize that three of these processes—reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensi-
tivity to operations, and commitment to resilience—are the theoretical mechanisms underlying the rela-
tionship between HR practices and innovation. We focus on these three processes because they are
crucial to sensing and anticipating change and reacting swiftly. That is, they are the essential infrastruc-
ture for staying ahead. Although the other two processes are important to the performance of HROs, we
exclude them because they are probably invariant in this sample as small and young firms are preoccu-
pied with failure (Stinchcombe, 1965) and underspecify their structures (Aldrich, 1999) out of necessity.
While all organizations are likely to derive some benefit from mindful operations, the value of mind-
fulness increases to the extent that an organization faces a tightly coupled and interactively complex
environment. Thus, the benefits of mindfulness and its constituent processes are largely contingent
upon a firm being an HRO or reliability seeking. The benefits of mindfulness are contingent because
although most of the extant literature on mindfulness treats it as an unmitigated positive (e.g., Weick &
Sutcliffe, 2001; Langer, 1989, 1997), there are significant costs associated with creating and maintain-
ing mindfulness (LaPorte, 1996). In addition, maintaining mindfulness in a stable environment could
cause efficiency losses as a firm unnecessarily expends resources on updating its picture of its envir-
onment (e.g., through scanning) when nothing or very little has changed.
HR practices and mindfulness
The cornerstone of our argument is that HR practices are the source of innovation and act as the struc-
tural starting point for mindful processing. HR practices have been shown to play a significant role in
preserving the nearly error-free performance of HROs (Gaba, 2000; Rochlin, LaPorte, & Roberts, 1998;
Weick & Roberts, 1993). Existing research in the strategic human resource management literature pro-
vides additional support for this line of thinking. For example, Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997)
found that several HR practices including employee involvement in problem-solving teams, job rotation,
regular sharing of information, and training increase production-line reliability in steel minimills.
Although Ichniowski et al. (1997) did not label their findings in the same way, each of their practices
can be readily recast as enhancing reliability through the processes of collective mindfulness: reluctance
to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to operations, and commitment to resilience. First, employee
involvement in multiple problem-solving teams and job rotation both create the capacity to remain reluc-
tant to simplify interpretations as multiple and divergent perspectives are brought to bear on problem-
solving and routine operations. Second, regular sharing of information between employees and manage-
ment endows both with a sense of an integrated big picture of plant operations and in doing so constructs
a sensitivity to operations. Lastly, investment in off-line training increases each employee’s coping skills
and ability to resiliently improvise a response in the face of the unexpected.
Extending this logic and prior work on HROs, we test the impact of a firm’s HR practices on inten-
sity of innovation. We argue that HR practices facilitate innovation by enabling and relying upon
three of the processes of collective mindfulness: reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to
STRUCTURING FOR HIGH RELIABILITY 881
Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. 24, 877–903 (2003)
operations, and commitment to resilience. These postulated, but unmeasured, theoretical mechanisms
underlie each of the hypothesized HR practice–innovation relationships as follows: the use of skilled
temporary employees creates divergent ideas and a reluctance to simplify interpretations, positive
employee relations create a climate that facilitates intensive ongoing communication and a sensitivity
to operations, and an emphasis on training values recovery skills and resilience and builds the compe-
tence to enable them. While these processes of mindfulness are theorized as byproducts of the HR
practices, we only hypothesize and test the direct relationship between HR practices and innovation.
Use of skilled temporary employees
In order to cope with the complexity of their environments, HROs and reliability-seeking organizations
are motivated to remain reluctant to simplify their interpretations, which means they make fewer
assumptions and take deliberate steps to create a complete and more nuanced picture (Weick &
Sutcliffe, 2001). At its core a reluctance to simplify interpretations is maintaining divergent perspec-
tives and broad repertoires of action. Using skilled temporary employees triggers a reluctance to sim-
plify interpretations because these employees introduce different ways of seeing that allow an
organization to notice more in its environment and create a greater number of potential recombinations
of existing knowledge. Prior research suggests that the use of skilled temporary employees unleashes
three mechanisms that increase divergence and innovation potential: conceptual slack (Schulman,
1993), minority influence (Nemeth, 1997; Nemeth & Staw, 1989; Nemeth, 1986; Nemeth & Kwan,
1985), and slow learning (March, 1991).
One of the primary contributions of skilled temporary employees to an organization is conceptual
slack (Schulman, 1993). Schulman (1993) defines conceptual slack as ‘a divergence in analytical per-
spectives among members of an organization over theories, models, or causal assumptions pertaining
to its technology or production processes’ (p. 364). Conceptual slack forces an organization to take less
for granted and to remain vigilant. This added vigilance is likely to produce new ideas and modes of
operating that can become innovations.
Skilled temporary employees also stimulate divergence through processes of minority influence
(Nemeth, 1986). Minority views, even when they are wrong, stimulate the majority to exert more cog-
nitive effort and think in more divergent ways. Laboratory work conducted by Nemeth and Kwan
(1985) found that exposure to persistent minority views led to increases in divergent and original
thought. Thus, skilled temporary employees, through minority influence, are likely to enhance innova-
tiveness. Langer (1989) also supports the view that skilled temporary employees encourage divergent
and original thought as she notes, ‘the imaginative use of ‘‘outsiders’’ [e.g., independent consultants]
can encourage . . .mindfulness . . . [and] can keep important questions flowing’ (p. 139).
Skilled temporary employees are also likely to increase innovation because they offer expertise that
benefits the organization, but are ‘slow learners’ in that they are slowly socialized and thus maintain
their divergent perspectives and stimulate further ‘exploration’ and innovation (March, 1991). In
further support of the idea that temporary employees will retain divergent perspectives over time,
Levesque, Wilson, and Wholey (2001) found that temporary software development project teams fail
to converge on a shared mental model.
Theorizing the use of temporary employees as a reliability-enhancing strategy may seem counter-
intuitive to scholars of HROs. For example, Rousseau and Libuser (1997) and Kochan, Wells, and
Smith (1992) have documented how inexperienced and untrained temporary workers have played a
significant role in organizational accidents in the construction, mining, and petrochemical industries
as well as the crash of a ValuJet DC-9. We argue that temporary employees enhance innovation as
a result of the unique nature of temporary employees in high-technology industries. Unlike the
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temporary workers in construction, mining, and petrochemicals, temporary employees and contractors
in high-technology industries (e.g., software) are found to rival permanent employees in performance
and skills (Jarmon, Paulson, & Rebne, 1998).
In sum, the use of skilled temporary employees should facilitate innovation because ‘innovation
requires preserving (not reducing) the uncertainty and diversity in the environment within the organi-
zation’ (Van de Ven, 1986, p. 605). To the extent that using skilled temporary employees preserves
uncertainty and multiple perspectives we hypothesize.
Hypothesis 1: Firms that utilize skilled temporary employees will achieve greater intensity of
innovation.
Positive employee relations
To maintain high performance under challenging conditions, HROs engage in extensive information
sharing across organizational levels that helps create an integrated big picture of operations in the
moment. Weick et al. (1999) refer to this comprehensive view of current operations as sensitivity to
operations. The frequent review of performance, operations, and environmental conditions embedded
in sensitivity to operations allows detection of problems and opportunities sooner, develops intuition
and flexible options, deepens personal knowledge of the enterprise, and facilitates improvisation to
cope with the unclear and changing environment (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi,
1995). This frequent review and updating is essential in reliability-seeking organizations because the
pace, frequency, and scale of change they face quickly render information inaccurate, obsolete, or una-
vailable. In IPO software firms the operations being attended to are the product development process.
However, we take a broader ‘communication web’ view of product development that asserts the better
that members are connected with one another and key outsiders (e.g., top management, sales and mar-
keting, and customers), the more successful and innovative the development process (Brown &
Eisenhardt, 1995).
Positive employee relations contribute a supportive organizational climate where people can build a
big picture through extensive communication and information sharing. The impact of positive
employee relations on communication and information sharing has been extensively discussed in
the strategic human resource management literature under several labels, including commitment-max-
imizing systems (Arthur, 1992), mutual investment (Tsui, Pearce, Porter, & Tripoli, 1997), and high-
performance work systems (Pfeffer, 1994, 1998). Each of these systems helps produce innovation by
way of increasing real-time communication and updating across levels. First, Arthur (1992) describes
employee relations in a commitment-maximizing system as enabling high levels of employee partici-
pation and involvement in decision-making as well as regular sharing of information with employees.
Second, Tsui et al. (1997) describe a mutual investment employment system as an employer’s
extended consideration of an employee’s well-being and career within the firm in exchange for the
employee’s willingness to be flexible, assist junior colleagues, and consider the unit’s or organization’s
interests as important as core job duties. Mutual investment is associated with citizenship behaviors
that include offering suggestions, expressing opinions, and frequently talking to management about
process improvement (p. 1104). Third, Pfeffer (1994, 1998) finds similar information sharing and
empowerment as essential components of high-performance work systems and effective performance.
Conversely, negative employee relations create conditions that undermine sensitivity to operations.
For example, downsizing increases worries, work pressures, overload, and, consequently, reduces
employee interaction and communication of critical information that leads to errors of omission
and insufficient understanding of organizational systems (Perron & Friedlander, 1996).
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Other literature also suggests how the real-time information gathering engendered by
positive employee relations promotes innovation. Eisenhardt and colleagues’ work on fast product
development and innovation suggests that firms perform better and innovate more frequently to the
extent that they act according to a constantly constructed, refined, and integrated picture of internal
operations and their environment through extensive exchange of real-time information (Brown &
Eisenhardt, 1997; Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). Waller (1999) similarly finds that in the complex
and demanding environment of flight operations frequent and early updating of an unfolding situation
through information collection and transfer leads to greater performance and successful adaptation to
novel events.
In sum, positive employee relations and the communication it engenders enhance a firm’s capabil-
ities for remaining sensitive to ongoing operations. This sensitivity reduces the incidence and impact
of surprises because maintaining sensitivity to operations entails constantly refining categories based
on real-time information, giving rise to innovation. Thus, we hypothesize.
Hypothesis 2: Firms with positive employee relations will achieve greater intensity of innovation.
Emphasis on training
In HROs, their ability to cope with the constant threat of surprise relies on their commitment to resi-
lience. Resilience entails both the ability to ‘absorb change and still persist . . . [and] to utilize the
change that is absorbed’ (Weick et al., 1999). HROs behave resiliently by preparing for inevitable sur-
prise and ‘expanding general knowledge and technical facility, and generalized command over
resources’ (Wildavsky, 1988, p. 221) through extensive training. An emphasis on training entails
recognizing that current skills are likely inadequate for possible future environments and that regular
acquisition, updating, and refreshing of skills are essential. By focusing on the frailty of current knowl-
edge and the inevitability of the unexpected, an emphasis on training embodies a commitment to resi-
lience. This finding has been corroborated in studies of aircraft carriers (Rochlin et al., 1998; Weick &
Roberts, 1993; Roberts, 1990), banking (Roberts & Libuser, 1993), and health care (Gaba, 2000). Just
as importantly, lack of training is often cited as a reason why small perturbations in a system amplify to
disasters. In summarizing the explosion at Bhopal, Roberts (1990) notes ‘the potpourri of human fac-
tors contributing to the accident might be summarized as factors brought by poor training and motiva-
tion, by inadequate staffing, and the lack of core values emphasizing safety reliability’ (p. 164,
emphasis added).
The capacity to both absorb and harness change is also crucial to reliability-seeking organizations as
their ability to quickly sense and respond to their extremely dynamic environments determines their
ability to remain viable. Hambrick and Crozier (1985) find that successful rapid-growth firms, like
HROs, recognize their frailty and place an emphasis on training and providing people with skills
before they are crucial. Training should facilitate remaining viable through innovation because ‘[i]f
people think they can do lots of things, then they can afford to pay attention to a wider variety of inputs
because, whatever they see, they will have some way to cope with it’ (Weick, 1988, p. 311) and, by
extension, they will be better equipped to improvise novel solutions. Wright and Snell (1998) describe
a similar process of ‘flexibility,’ at the organizational level of analysis, ‘as the extent to which the firm’s
human resources possess skills and behavioral repertoires that can give a firm options for pursuing
strategic alternatives’ (p. 761). Firms with more strategic options can foresee and navigate more poten-
tial environments and more readily recombine these options into novel actions. To the extent that an
emphasis on training fosters a commitment to resilience by building broad behavioral repertoires and
the capability for improvisation leads us to hypothesize.
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Hypothesis 3: Firms emphasizing training will achieve greater intensity of innovation.
Prior research on HROs has noted that HROs pursue reliability at the expense of efficiency (Schulman,
2002; Creed, Stout, & Roberts, 1993). HROs trade off efficiency for reliability because short-term effi-
ciency may significantly undermine long-term viability by causing an organization to make potentially
fatal errors of omission. While reliability-seeking organizations are less able to make these trade-offs,
to the extent that their environments demand considerable innovation, they will likely favor explora-
tion at the cost of exploitation (March, 1991). Thus although each of the HR practices should positively
affect intensity of innovation, it may come at the cost of short-term macro performance indicators such
as stock price. The trade-off occurs because firms have to explore and maintain more ideas, refresh
their picture of the environment more frequently, and regularly build capacity to meet the demands
of ever-changing environments in order to innovate. As a result, these firms are often unable to reap
the efficiency gains of routinization and standard operating procedures. On the other hand, greater
intensity of innovation should positively impact financial performance for two reasons. First, prior
research on innovation (i.e., patenting), suggests that the volume of innovation acts as a leading indi-
cator of financial performance and is ‘reliably associated with the future performance . . . in capital
markets’ (Deng, Lev, & Narin, 1999, p. 20). Second, ‘in a world of uncertainty, potential members,
investors, and clients may value reliability’ (Hannan & Freeman, 1989, p. 72). Having a greater num-
ber of innovations (i.e., patents) sends a clear signal about a firm’s level of technical knowledge and its
ability to stay ahead of technological progress through innovating. In addition, for some IPO software
firms a patent is their most marketable asset (Wilbon, 1999). To the extent that the HR practices of
reliability-seeking organizations favor exploration and innovation over exploitation and efficiency,
and innovations are important signals of reliability and future performance, we hypothesize.
Hypothesis 4: Intensity of innovation will mediate the relationship between skilled temporary
employees, positive employee relations, and an emphasis on training and financial performance.
In sum, we hypothesize that the use of skilled temporary employees, positive employee relations, and
an emphasis on training all result in greater intensity of innovation. These innovations, in turn, result in
greater financial performance. Figure 1 summarizes the hypotheses graphically. Figure 1 also illus-
trates that we theorized, but did not measure, that HR practices lead to greater intensity of innovation
through reluctance to simplify interpretations, sensitivity to operations, and commitment to resilience.
In the next section we will discuss the sample, data collection and coding, variable definitions, oper-
ationalizations, and the statistical methods utilized.
Figure 1. A conceptual model of HR practices, mindful processes, intensity of innovation, and financial
performance
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Organizational Context
IPO Software Firms and their Environments
The IPO software firms in this study exist in an extremely precarious position due to the character-
istics of these firms and the nature of the competitive environments. Generally, these firms are small
(i.e., fewer than 100 employees), young (less than 7 years old), and cash poor (even after the infu-
sion of cash through the IPO process). Each of these characteristics makes these firms especially
vulnerable even to slight disruptions because they have extremely limited resources and slack.
These traits are exacerbated by the nature of the relations these firms have with other organizations
in their environments. For example, IPO software firms are often heavily reliant on one customer,
supplier, or strategic partner. If any one of these other organizations were to fail, it is likely the IPO
software firm would also fail because they have no other options. IPO software firms are also
embedded in intense competitive environments where missing a ‘window’ for developing and intro-
ducing a product or failing to swiftly and continuously innovate is also met with failure.
Technological Change in the 1990s
During the period under study, 1993–2000, IPO software firms faced rapid, endemic, and discon-
tinuous technological change. For example, several significant technological advances occurred
during this period, including: multimedia, Internet, LAN-based networks, and the JAVA program-
ming language. At the same time the nature of technological changes was becoming more funda-
mental and transformational as software began its convergence with telecommunications and
consumer electronics such that changes in one area had rapid and significant ramifications for
the others.
The Rise of the Software Patent
Given the discontinuous change facing IPO software firms (and the software industry more gener-
ally), firms began to utilize patenting as a strategy for capturing more of the financial benefits from
their innovations. Prior to the 1990s, the less costly and time-consuming process of copyrighting
software had been the primary mode of intellectual property protection, but copyright protection
was significantly eroded in the 1995 Lotus v. Borland decision that ruled that ‘second movers’ must
be allowed to emulate and extend the innovator’s code and methods. As such, software-related
patents have grown tremendously over the past decade from virtually zero in the 1970s and
1980s to 3600 in 1993 and 8100 in 1996 and 17,500 in 1998. The major advantage of patents
for software firms is that they preclude others from making commercial use of a patented technique,
even if it is developed with no knowledge of the patented work, as long as the patent is in force.
Most noteworthy was the 1994 decision of Stac Electronics v. Microsoft, where the court awarded
Stac $125 million as a result of Microsoft violating their patent. While the fine did not significantly
damage Microsoft, it did help Stac remain viable as Microsoft’s infringing product had to be with-
drawn from the market. This case gave further impetus for small firms like those in our sample to
pursue patents in order to stave off larger competitors. While patenting became increasingly popular
during the 1990s and offered considerable benefits for the patenting firms, it did not do so without
considerable controversy. The practice of patenting software led to the emergence of groups of
extremely vocal detractors (e.g., the League for Programming Freedom) who asserted that software
patents undermined the collaboration that fuels the U.S. software industry and are often improperly
granted to widely known practices or algorithms that fail to meet the patent and trademark office’s
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Methods
Sample
The initial sample was drawn from all software firms that conducted their IPO between 1993 and 1996
(N¼ 269 firms). We define software firms as firms in SIC codes 7371 (computer programming services)
and 7372 (prepackaged software). We chose these two segments because they are a locus of innovation
in the software industry as well as extremely competitive segments. Furthermore, the distinction between
the prepackaged software and computer programming services segments has blurred during recent years
as many of these firms have merged and begun competing in each other’s sectors (Steinmueller, 1996).
SIC code 7373 (computer-integrated system design) also comprises a significant portion of computer
software industry revenue and innovation, but we exclude it from our analysis because firms in this seg-
ment also derive a portion of their revenue from computer hardware. Competing in the hardware market
is problematic because these firms face different competitive conditions and patenting conventions.
Although these industry categorizations are fairly coarse grained, in that the firms in a four-digit SIC
code may never directly compete, a more fine-grained distinction would require a much larger sample.
For example, the Software Encyclopedia (1999) categorizes the software industry into 39 segments and
hundreds of subcategories. More importantly, in the hypercompetitive and interactively complex envir-
onments that reliability-seeking organizations face, any firm in a related industry is a potential and plau-
sible competitor. Thus, further segmenting the sample may overly compartmentalize what are truly fluid
and permeable boundaries. We also eschew a more fine-grained analysis of sectors because all the firms
do compete in one critical arena—the labor market for technical talent. They all seek to attract and retain
the top programmers and technical staff (and they so note repeatedly in their prospectuses).
Moreover, in order to adequately test our hypotheses regarding the intensity of innovation we
needed to examine the dependent variables over a relevant period of time (i.e., 3 years after the
IPO), and this reduced our sample size. Of the 269 software firms that conducted their IPO between
1993 and 1996, 85 (32 per cent of the original sample) had either gone bankrupt, merged, been
acquired, or had been delisted by the SEC. This reduced our final sample to 184. We accept a reduced
sample because it is essential to our theoretical argument to observe the firms’ ability to innovate over
time. The 184 firms in the final sample were on average 7 years old (SD¼ 4.79). The median firm,
however, was 6 years old, and the range was from 1 to 27 years old. Given the age data were skewed,
we logarithmically transformed the variable. The average firm in the sample employed 238 people
(SD¼ 706.60). The median firm had 132 employees with a range from 11 to 9200. Given the skewed
size distribution, we again used the logarithm of the number of employees in the analyses. Each U.S.
geographic area is represented in the sample and 31 per cent of the firms are headquartered in Silicon
Valley. International firms comprised 3.8 per cent of the sample. Table 1 reports the means, standard
deviations, and medians for the variables used in the analyses.
litmus test of being ‘novel and nonobvious.’ More specifically, these detractors point to the granting
of ‘overly broad’ patents such as in 1993 when Compton’s New Media was granted a patent on the
process and concept of multimedia (Shulman, 2000). Although Compton’s patent was subsequently
revoked and the patent and trademark office has significantly increased staffing and improved its
database of prior art (i.e., previously granted patents) that helps narrow the claims of new patents,
software patents remain controversial.
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Data collection and coding
The primary data source was the prospectus of each firm in the sample. The prospectus is the document
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prior to a firm’s IPO. Strict guidelines gov-
ern the content and the format of a prospectus and firms are legally liable for any information that
might mislead investors (O’Flaherty, 1984). The Securities Act of 1933 sets specific requirements
for the prospectus and thereby insures its consistency. The typical prospectus-writing process involves
two investment banking firms, multiple lawyers, and a certified public accountant (Welbourne & Cyr,
1999). Each party has a vested interest and a legal obligation to provide an honest and accurate assess-
ment of a company. The utility and validity of the prospectus as a data source have also been demon-
strated in prior research (e.g., Welbourne & Cyr, 1999; Welbourne & Andrews, 1996). The coding
strategy employed for this study is similar to that used by Welbourne and Andrews (1996) and
Welbourne and Cyr (1999). Code sheets and a coding handbook were given to each of five coders after
an initial training session. This team of coders also met with one of the authors on a weekly basis to
discuss problems and inconsistencies in the coding process. We also randomly cross-coded every tenth
prospectus. For the variables used in this study, inter-coder agreement was 90 per cent or higher. This
inter-coder agreement reflects the percentage of exact matches between a coder and a cross-coder. We
also conducted additional tests to ensure there was adequate correspondence between coders. All inter-
coder correlations were greater than 0.885 and the Spearman–Brown formula of effective reliability
(Lee, Hallahan, & Herzog, 1996) produced values greater than 0.938.2 In addition to the prospectus,
additional financial and patent data was obtained from the following sources: COMPUSTAT for finan-
cial data, CRSP and Going Public: The IPO Reporter for stock price data, and the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office database for patent data.
Variables
Dependent variables
Intensity of innovation. We use patents as our measure of innovation and a dependent variable.
We operationalize a firm’s intensity of innovation as the number of post-IPO patents. Patents are
included in the dependent variable as long as the firm applied for the patent after the date of their
IPO, prior to 3 years after their IPO, and the patent was granted by December 31, 2000. This opera-
tionalization of intensity of innovation corresponds to our theoretical definition of reliability as ‘an
unusual capacity to produce collective outcomes of a certain minimum quality repeatedly’ (Hannan
& Freeman, 1984, p. 153). First, a patent is a collective outcome because it is often the result of col-
lective research (i.e., the patent is granted to multiple researchers) and even if it isn’t the process of
patenting enlists multiple personnel throughout the organization (e.g., technical, managerial, and legal
staff). Further, a patent is ensured to be of a certain minimal quality based on the elaborate, and often
lengthy, process for approving a patent by a patent examiner at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office,
which ensures each patent granted meets the threshold of being a ‘novel and nonobvious’ invention
and that the claims of the patent are not overly broad and do not impinge upon previously granted
patents (i.e., ‘prior art’). Second, to the extent that a firm has greater intensity of innovation (i.e., more
patents) during a given period, they have produced ‘collective outcomes of a certain minimum quality
repeatedly’ or multiple times. Three years is a relevant window over which to assess a firm’s intensity
2The Spearman–Brown coefficient is calculated using the following formula nr/1þ (n1)r, where n¼ number of coders and
r¼ average intercorrelation of the coders ratings. The Spearman–Brown formula is interpreted like other measures of effective
reliability such as Cronbach’s alpha.
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of innovation because it allows each firm to process at least one cohort of patents (the software patent
process usually take between 18 and 30 months, although the lag time has decreased in recent years).
The use of patents as a proxy for innovation has a long history in economics (see Griliches, 1990, for
a review) and has been used in a variety of industries, including pharmaceuticals (Cockburn &
Henderson, 1998), semiconductors (Sorensen & Stuart, 2000), biotechnology (Powell et al., 1996),
and chemical processing (Ahuja, 2000). While the plethora of studies using patents as a measure of
innovation help justify our usage, patenting in the software industry has a unique history that merits
further explanation. This history is the type of contextual factor that Rousseau and Fried (2001) assert
is of critical importance to nuanced analysis in organizational behavior. Patenting in the computer soft-
ware industry (and patenting software in general) has an extremely contentious history. Software
patents have some extremely vocal detractors (e.g., the League for Programming Freedom) that assert
patents undermine the collaboration that fuels the U.S. software industry and are often improperly
granted to widely known practices or algorithms, which fail to meet the patent and trademark office’s
litmus test of being ‘novel and nonobvious.’ These unique circumstances lead us to utilize zero-inflated
Poisson regression, which accounts for the fact that some firms may systematically not attempt to
patent (e.g., they consider the patent approval process too costly or software patents ideologically pro-
blematic). This method accounts for the fact the not all firms are equally likely to patent and we
describe this method in more detail in the results section. We also believe that three additional factors
render patents a useful proxy for innovation.
First, capitalizing on and protecting innovation through patents is of utmost importance to these nas-
cent firms. In the sample more than 84 per cent of the firms noted the risk of not gaining or losing a
patent and more than 90 per cent cited the risk of technological obsolescence as material risks to their
continuing viability in the risk factors section of their IPO prospectus. The major advantage for soft-
ware firms is that patents preclude others from making commercial use of a patented technique, even if
it is developed with no knowledge of the patented work, as long as the patent is in force (Nichols,
1998). Second, patents have also become increasingly popular in the industry. The number of soft-
ware-related patents has grown tremendously over the past decade from virtually zero in the 1970s
and 1980s to 3600 in 1993 and 8100 in 1996 (Nichols, 1998) and 17 500 in 1998 (Erickson, 1999).
Lastly, the firms in our sample with the highest patent counts (e.g., Netscape Communications) corre-
sponded with qualitative rankings of ‘most innovative’ and ‘best software applications’ by industry
analysts from trade magazines (e.g., Publish!, PC, PC Computing, and Windows as summarized in
the Software Encyclopedia, 1999).
Financial performance. In order to test the impact of innovation on more macro, less proximate
performance outcomes, we conducted analyses using stock price as a dependent variable. Stock price
is arguably the most important indicator of financial health for IPO firms (Ibbotson & Ritter, 1995).
Stock price has also been suggested as an important outcome of effective HR practices (e.g.,
Welbourne & Andrews, 1996; Abowd, Milkovich, & Hannon, 1990). The variable is measured as stock
price (adjusted for splits, buybacks, and changes in the underlying capital structure that may affect unit
price) 3 years after IPO. The variable is then logarithmically transformed to correct for skewness in its
distribution.
Independent variables
Skilled temporary employees. We code temporary employees using a dummy variable (1) if a
firm mentions the current use of temporary employees, independent contractors, consultants, or con-
tingent workers. Part-time workers are not included in the measure of temporary employees. While
these distinctions may embody differences on a number of dimensions (e.g., career possibilities;
see Kalleberg, 2000, for a comprehensive review of these different types of work and their
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consequences), they are all substantively similar in terms of their contribution to the organization—
expertise and divergent perspectives without incurring fixed costs. Although these workers are simi-
larly utilized throughout our sample, the measure admittedly smoothes over what may be significant
differences between temporary employees, independent contractors, contingent workers, and consul-
tants, so the results should be taken as suggestive. However, statistical testing using this measure
should be considered a strong test because the measure has a great deal of noise that could obscure
statistical significance.
Positive employee relations. The SEC requires employers to rate their employee relations as
either poor, satisfactory, good, very good, or excellent (Welbourne & Andrews, 1996). We code
employee relations as three dummy variables (excellent, very good, and good) because it is unclear
that the differences between satisfactory and good, good and very good, very good and excellent are of
the same magnitude, which is a necessary precondition for an ordinal measure. Satisfactory acts as the
base category. Poor is not included as a category in the analysis because no firms in the sample rated
their employee relations as poor.
Emphasis on training. An emphasis on training is a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm mentions
employee training in the prospectus and 0 otherwise. We view the mention of training as significant
because it illustrates the relative importance of training vis-à-vis other potential practices (Welbourne
& Andrews, 1996). Even this minimalist coding of training surfaces considerable variation as nearly
half (48 per cent) of the firms in the sample make no mention of training.
Mediating variable
Intensity of innovation. The mediator proposed in Hypothesis 4 is the intensity of innovation.
While this measure is largely consistent with our dependent variable, we adjusted the measure for
use as a mediator to ensure that it was temporally prior to our measure of financial performance.
We specifically measured the mediating variable as the number of patents filed after the date of
IPO (e.g., 1993) and granted prior to the end of the third year after IPO (e.g., 1996). While this adjusted
measure seems contemporaneous with the dependent variable (i.e., stock price 3 years after IPO), in
practice no firms patented within 1 month of the end of the third year after IPO. Thus, a slight lag
exists. A short or no lag, however, appears to be appropriate based on prior theoretical and empirical
work. Theoretically, the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970) posits that the stock price takes into
account the value of all relevant available information. Once granted, patents become publicly avail-
able information and as such should be quickly incorporated into a firm’s stock price. Furthermore,
prior empirical work by Cockburn and Griliches (1988) finds that the stock market values ‘news’ in
R&D (i.e., new patents).
Control variables
Based upon a review of the patenting/innovation (Sorensen & Stuart, 2000; Griliches, 1990) and the
strategic human resource management literatures (Welbourne & Cyr, 1999; Welbourne & Andrews,
1996; Huselid, 1995) we include the following control variables previously demonstrated to have
effects on innovation, patenting, and firm performance.
Firm age. Consistent with Sorensen and Stuart’s (2000) finding that older firms are more prolific
at patenting, we control for age. Age is measured as the natural log of the year of incorporation sub-
tracted from the year of IPO. We take the natural logarithm of this variable to correct for skewness in
its distribution. Year of incorporation is used instead of year of founding because many firms did not
report the year of their founding and because the nature of the business may have substantially changed
between the year of founding and incorporation.
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Firm size. We measure size as the natural logarithm of the total number of employees at the time
of IPO. We take the natural logarithm of the number of employees to control for the skewness in the
size distribution. Because some software firms have no revenues and are considered ‘development
stage’ companies with primarily intangible assets, headcount is an appropriate measure of size. Results
are virtually identical using sales instead of number of employees as a measure of size (the two mea-
sures are highly correlated, r¼ 0.95, p< 0.001).
Prior patents. Given that firms may not pursue patenting because the process is too costly, too
slow, or too contrary to their ideology, it is likely that firms that patent prior to their IPO will patent
afterwards. We measured prior patents utilizing a count variable rather than a dichotomous variable
because all patenting firms are not equal and a firm with five patents at IPO should be more likely to
patent after its IPO than a firm with only one. In other words, firms that have applied for and received
many patents have a lower cost of patenting or a lower threshold for filing for a patent (Sorensen &
Stuart, 2000). Prior patents are measured as the total number of patent applications filed and granted
prior to the IPO date.
R&D intensity. R&D activity has a well-established relationship and long history in studies of
patenting (e.g., Griliches, 1990; Hausman, Hall, & Griliches, 1984). We calculate R&D intensity by
dividing R&D spending by sales in order to control for the fact that large firms spend more on R&D.
We used sales and R&D spending data from the year of IPO because once a firm goes public it under-
goes both a quantitative (from the infusion of cash) and qualitative transformation that renders prior
spending and revenue levels less reflective of the firm in its post-IPO form. We then take the natural
logarithm of this variable plus unity to correct for skewness in its distribution. We use the variable plus
unity because a small number of firms had zero sales.
Stock price at IPO. Stock price at IPO was used to control for prior firm performance. When a
firm goes public the initial price is set based on prior performance and potential performance (see
Ibbotson & Ritter, 1995, for additional discussion of IPO pricing). As such, the initial price of a firm’s
stock should impact its future performance. Stock price at IPO is a better indicator of prior perfor-
mance for this sample than profits because at the time of IPO firms may have operating losses or zero
profits. Stock price at IPO is measured as the offer price listed in the prospectus (this measure
correlates r¼ 0.97, p< 0.001 with a measure of the offer price as reported in Going Public: The
IPO Reporter).
Silicon Valley. We controlled for the location of firm headquarters because firms embedded in a
regional nexus of innovating (and patenting) are more likely to innovate due to knowledge spillover
effects and intraregional personnel movement. These firms may also perform better for similar reasons.
Saxenian (1994) has documented such activity in California’s Silicon Valley. Almeida and Kogut
(1999) studied engineer mobility in regional networks and found that ‘only Silicon Valley exhibits
strong localization effects’ (p. 912). That is, knowledge in Silicon Valley tends to stay in Silicon Valley
and, in order to capitalize on the externalities of such knowledge, firms must locate in Silicon Valley
and become part of the regional network. Therefore, a control is included for whether or not the firm is
headquartered in Silicon Valley (1 if yes, 0 otherwise). We do not include additional dummy variables
for other regional hubs (e.g., Austin, Minneapolis, North Carolina’s Research Triangle, Boston’s Route
128, and New York’s Silicon Alley) that may exhibit similar properties because these firms either com-
prise a much smaller portion of the sample, or these hubs had yet to emerge as of the period under
study. Controlling for location in Silicon Valley is also essential given the size of the firms in our sam-
ple. Acs, Audretsch, and Feldman (1994) have found that small firms benefit disproportionately from
spillovers from universities and larger firms.
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SIC code. Although both the SIC codes used to comprise our sample were chosen for their
contribution to innovation and patenting, it is possible that firms in a given industry classification
have a greater propensity to patent. Therefore, we control for SIC code using a dummy variable
(1¼ SIC 7372; prepackaged software). Data regarding a firm’s primary SIC code was obtained from
CRSP.
Period effects. Using four cohorts of IPO software firms (1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996) to test our
hypotheses provides a more robust test. However, each period can have particular effects that bias the
estimators and remain unaccounted for in other variables. Thus, period effects were controlled using
three dummy variables for the year of IPO (1994, 1995, and 1996) with 1993 as the base line category.
A firm was coded as belonging to the year in which it went public as indicated in Going Public: The
IPO Reporter.
Results
The descriptive statistics and correlation matrix can be seen in Table 1. The most noteworthy descrip-
tive statistic is the significantly inflated value of R&D intensity. This inflation results from three out-
liers that have R&D intensities greater than 100. These outliers are ‘development stage’ firms that have
extremely low revenue. Without these three observations the mean is 0.28 (SD¼ 0.60). The median of
0.17 also presents a more accurate picture of representative levels of R&D intensity. We include these
observations in both the correlations and in our regression analyses for two reasons: first, the impact of
the outliers is reduced by taking the natural logarithm of R&D intensity; and second, the results remain
substantively similar with or without the observations. The correlation matrix indicates that the vari-
ables are largely uncorrelated. The absence of strong correlations between the variables minimizes the
risk of multicollinearity.
To test Hypotheses 1 through 3 we utilized zero-inflated Poisson regression. Count models such as
Poisson regression and negative binomial regression have a long history in analysis of patent data
(Griliches, 1990). The use of software patents as a dependent variable poses some unique problems
because some firms do not attempt to patent as a matter of strategy, ideology, or other reasons. This
empirical reality is problematic for a standard Poisson regression because it will under-predict the
number of zeros and fail to distinguish between a firm that tries to patent but fails from a firm that
does not try. The zero-inflated method explicitly assumes that zeros occur through two processes:
(1) always has a zero count, for example, a firm that believes patents are too costly and thus does
not file a patent application; and (2) has zeros by chance, for example, a firm that tries to patent an
innovation, but the patent is rejected. The zero-inflated Poisson allows the probability of always being
zero (i) to be determined by characteristics of the firm using a logistic regression (Long, 1997). For
those firms not always zero, counts are determined by combining the binary process (the probability of
not remaining at zero, 1i) and a Poisson count model. The full model for the firms that are not
always zero is
Prðyi j xiÞ ¼ ð1 iÞ
expðiÞyii
yi!
where 1i is the probability of not always having a zero count as estimated using characteristics of
the firm and exp(i)iyi/yi! is a Poisson process where ¼ exp(xB) and xB is a vector of firm char-
acteristics (Long, 1997). The zero-inflated Poisson models were estimated using Stata 7.0.
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The results of our regression analyses are reported in Table 2. In the first model we utilize the zero-
inflated Poisson to estimate the expected number of post-IPO patents. The overall equation is signifi-
cant (chi-square¼ 128.50, p< 0.001). Next, we performed a Vuong test for non-nested models to
determine whether the zero-inflated model was a better fit for the data than a standard Poisson regres-
sion. The Vuong test generates a test statistic that has a standard normal distribution with large positive
values favoring the zero-inflated model and with large negative values favoring the non-zero-inflated
version (Long, 1997). Values close to zero in absolute value favor neither model. For Model 1 in
Table 2 the Vuong statistic is 2.47 (p< 0.01), indicating the zero-inflated model is a better fit. This
empirically confirms the assertion that failing to patent in the software industry is a result of two dis-
tinct processes of either not trying to patent or trying and failing.
We modeled the probability of remaining at zero using two independent variables: patents prior to
IPO and being headquartered in Silicon Valley. The results (not reported in Table 2) indicate that both
significantly predict the probability of a firm remaining at zero patents. Firms with patents prior to IPO
are less likely to have zero patents after IPO (B¼1.04, p< 0.001). In other words, for each addi-
tional patent prior to IPO the odds of a firm not patenting after IPO are decreased 65 per cent. Firms
headquartered in Silicon Valley are also significantly less likely to have zero patents after IPO
Table 2. Regression analyses of patent counts and stock price
Patent count Stock price
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Independent variables
Training 0.72*** (3.54) 0.05 (0.28) 0.07 (1.46)
Employee relations—excellent 2.47** (2.71) 0.80y (1.76) 0.84* (1.85)
Employee relations—very good 20.16 (0.00) 1.00y (1.32) 1.01y (1.34)
Employee relations—good 1.67* (2.00) 0.35 (1.11) 0.35 (1.11)
Temporary employees 1.00*** (3.67) 0.07 (0.27) 0.02 (0.10)
Mediating variable
Post-IPO patent count 0.04y (1.46)
Control variables
Patents at IPO 0.00 (0.06)
R&D/sales 0.09* (2.39)
Firm HQ in Silicon Valley 0.04 (0.20) 0.08 (0.42) 0.05 (0.29)
Firm size at IPOa 0.24y (1.93) 0.27* (2.22) 0.27* (2.40)
Firm age at IPOa 0.65*** (6.20) 0.08 (0.79) 0.06 (0.60)
Stock price at IPO 0.11*** (5.05) 0.10*** (4.36)
SIC Codeb 1.16** (2.89) 0.03 (0.14) 0.02 (0.10)
Period effects (1993 IPO baseline)
1996 IPO 0.18 (0.53) 0.63* (2.26) 0.60* (2.17)
1995 IPO 0.99*** (3.46) 0.53y (1.90) 0.50y (1.83)





N 184 184 184




b1¼ SIC 7372 (Prepackaged Software).
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(B¼1.12, p< 0.05) as being headquartered in Silicon Valley reduces the likelihood of not patenting
after IPO by 67 per cent. We also tested numerous other specifications in this portion of the model, but
the pattern of results was substantively similar and no other variables were statistically significant in
predicting the probability of a firm remaining at zero patents. Thus, we utilized the more parsimonious
model.
We evaluate our hypotheses using the count portion of Model 1. All findings in the count portion of
Model 1 should be interpreted as only applying to those firms at risk of patenting (i.e., not including the
firms that will never attempt to patent due to ideological, strategic, or other reasons). Hypothesis 1
proposed that firms using skilled temporary employees would produce more innovations and was
strongly supported (B¼ 1.00, p< 0.001). In other words, for firms at risk of patenting, using skilled
temporary employees increases the expected number of patents by a factor of 2.72 or 272 per cent,
holding all other variables constant. Hypothesis 2 asserted that firms possessing positive (excellent,
very good, or good) employee relations would innovate more than firms with negative (satisfactory)
employee relations. Our findings partially support Hypothesis 2, as firms at risk of patenting with
either excellent (B¼ 2.40, p< 0.01) or good (B¼ 1.67, p< 0.05) employee relations were significantly
associated with greater intensity of innovation than firms with satisfactory employee relations (the
baseline category). The effect of employee relations is especially pronounced as firms at risk of patent-
ing with excellent employee relations increase their expected number of patents by a factor 11.07 or
1107 per cent and firms at risk of patenting with good employee relations increase their number of
patents by a factor of 5.31 or 531 per cent relative to satisfactory employee relations, holding all other
variables constant. However, for firms at risk of patenting, very good employee relations (B¼20.16,
n.s.) were not associated with greater innovative output than firms with satisfactory employee rela-
tions. Although very good employee relations exhibited no relationship with the expected number
of post-IPO patents, this non-finding should be taken with caution as only 3 (1.63 per cent) of the
184 firms in our sample reported very good employee relations. Thus, the lack of support may be
an artifact of the small number of observations for very good employee relations. Lastly,
Hypothesis 3 posited that an emphasis on training would lead to greater intensity of innovation.
Hypothesis 3 receives strong support as an emphasis on training (B¼ 0.73, p< 0.001) for firms at risk
of patenting is significantly related to the expected number of post-IPO patents. In real terms, firms at
risk of patenting with an emphasis on training increase their expected number of patents by a factor of
2.07 or 207 per cent, holding all other variables constant. Overall, when a firm at risk of patenting
combines the use of skilled temporary employees, excellent employee relations, and an emphasis
on training with the rest of the variables held at their mean, the expected count is 5.1 patents and these
firms have a 32 per cent probability of having more than three patents after their IPO. This is a marked
increase over the expected count of 0.46 and 0.4 per cent probability of having greater than three
patents in a firm at risk of patenting where all variables are held at their mean. In a firm at risk of
patenting where all the variables of interest are held at zero, the results are even starker as the expected
count is 0.08 and there is only a 2.8 per cent probability of having more than zero post-IPO patents.
From these results we conclude that the use of skilled temporary employees, positive employee rela-
tions, and an emphasis on training strongly increase innovative output by IPO software firms.
Among the control variables it is interesting to note that neither being headquartered in Silicon Val-
ley nor patenting prior to IPO significantly influences the expected count of patents after IPO. It seems
these variables only influence a firm’s decision to attempt to patent and not necessarily their success in
doing so. One other result worth mentioning is the strong negative relationship between firm age
(B¼0.65, p< 0.001) and the expected count of post-IPO patents. This finding contradicts Sorensen
and Stuart’s (2000) finding that older firms patent more frequently. However, our finding should not be
taken as decisive because it may be a function of the sample and the industry. The older firms in our
sample may not patent because patenting software was not common practice until the mid 1990s. Prior
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to this time copyright was the default mode of intellectual property protection. Consequently, firms
with established routines for copyrighting may have had difficulty transitioning to the much more com-
plex and costly process of filing patents. Thus, our anomalous finding suggests that the relationship
between firm age and patenting may be contingent upon the imprinting that occurred during the era
of a firm’s founding (Stinchcombe, 1965).
To test Hypothesis 4, that the proposed mediator (number of post-IPO patents) mediates the effects
of the independent variables (using skilled temporary employees, positive employee relations, and an
emphasis on training) on the dependent variable (stock price), we conducted a three-stage analysis to
test whether the following three criteria for mediation were met: (1) the three HR practice variables
affect post-IPO patents (Model 1); (2) the three HR practice variables affect stock price 3 years after
IPO (Model 2); and (3) the number of post-IPO patents affect stock price 3 years after IPO (Model 3).
If these three conditions are met and in the predicted direction, the final requirement for mediation is
that the effect of contribution of the three HR practice variables on stock price 3 years after IPO either
decreases (partial mediation) or becomes insignificant (‘perfect mediation’) between Model 2 and
Model 3 (Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 1177). We tested for mediation using ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression analyses by regressing the log of stock price 3 years after IPO on the independent,
mediating, and control variables. The first condition, that the three HR practice variables significantly
affect the number of post-IPO patents, is strongly supported in Model 1. The test for the second con-
dition of mediation is shown in Model 2 of Table 2. The results do not support this condition of media-
tion as an emphasis on training (B¼0.05, n.s.), the use of skilled temporary employees (B¼ 0.07,
n.s.), and good employee relations (B¼0.35, n.s.) have no relationship with the dependent variable,
while the effect of excellent employee relations’ (B¼0.80, p< 0.10) is in the opposite direction of
what we predicted. The lone exception is very good employee relations (B¼ 1.00, p< 0.10), which
had a moderately significant positive effect on stock price 3 years after IPO, relative to satisfactory
employee relations. As previously discussed, in order to test for the third condition of mediation we
measured the proposed mediator as the number of patents granted prior to the end of the third year after
IPO. Lastly, the data tenuously support the third criterion for mediation as the number of post-IPO
patents has a significant positive effect on stock price (B¼ 0.04, p< 0.10) and on the overall fit of
the model (R2¼ 0.01, F¼ 2.13, p< 0.01). Given that condition 2 of mediation was not met and con-
dition 3 only received marginal support, Hypothesis 4 receives no support. We discuss this unexpected
finding in more detail in the discussion section. Different specifications of the dependent variable (e.g.,
difference score, per centage change) yielded substantively similar results.
Discussion
Two questions motivated this study: Under what conditions do ordinary organizations resemble
HROs? How do firms organize to replicate the extraordinary performance of HROs? First, we proposed
that firms become reliability seeking to the extent that their organization–environment relations are
interactively complex and tightly coupled. Second, we argued that three HR practices—use of skilled
temporary employees, positive employee relations, and an emphasis on training—generate innovation
through the theorized, but unmeasured, processes of collective mindfulness. The quantitative analyses
strongly supported the hypothesized relationships as all three HR practices substantially increased
innovation, which, in turn, increased stock price 3 years after IPO.
We proposed that skilled temporary employees complicate existing mindsets and maintain divergent
perspectives that foster innovation. Qualitative data from our sample provides some additional support
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for our theoretical claim that each HR practice enables and generates innovation via a process of col-
lective mindfulness. For example, one firm argues that having skilled temporary employees is a way to
access unique and valuable skills they might not otherwise be able obtain or build due to the prohibi-
tive costs that a small software firm has difficulty bearing. Another firm similarly argues, ‘the most
innovative and successful new software products are likely to be generated by independent develo-
pers . . . [using independent contractors] will result in [the company] having access to talented indepen-
dent developers without the overhead and administrative structure.’
Second, we theorized that positive employee relations enable innovation by way of intensive com-
munication and sensitivity to ongoing operations. Qualitative data from a firm with excellent employee
relations provides suggestive support for this claim as its supportive climate fosters ‘honest, open and
ethical dealings’ and real-time information sharing across levels. An additional press account
(Petzinger, 1997) indicated that this same firm goes to additional lengths to construct an accurate pic-
ture of operations in the moment through real-time information sharing as it utilizes a system where all
employees file regular personal-action reports that identify major obstacles to their work. Everyone’s
report is subsequently posted electronically for everyone else’s inspection. This system keeps real-time
information flowing and enhances the possibility for innovative solutions to problems because all pro-
blems are being shared with all parties.
Third, we theorized that an emphasis on training creates a commitment to resilience and builds the
requisite cognitive and behavioral resources to manage growth and improvise solutions in an ever-
changing environment. One firm notes that it ‘trains its professionals in both legacy systems and emer-
ging technologies’ and thereby endows them with the skills to cope with many potential states of the
environment. A different firm similarly notes ‘the Company has an extensive training infrastructure-
. . . trains employees on a variety of platforms and helps them transition from legacy to client/server
skills by providing cross-platform training in new technologies.’ This quote emphasizes how training
helps upgrade skills so individuals feel as though they are broadly skilled and, subsequently, can attend
to a wider variety of inputs (Weick, 1988).
Hypothesis 4, suggesting that innovation mediates the effect of the HR practices on firm perfor-
mance, was not supported. While this finding is partially consistent with a reliability–efficiency
trade-off, whereby HR practices have their greatest impact on more proximate measures of perfor-
mance, it merits further exploration in future studies. One possible explanation for our finding is that
the 3-year lag between when the HR practices and stock price are measured may be too long an inter-
val. The efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970) posits that the stock market reacts to new informa-
tion. Thus any impact of HR practices on stock price would occur relatively shortly after they were
implemented. Furthermore, the HR practices are measured at one point in time, IPO. It is possible that
these practices may have changed over time and these new practices may not have been as well
received and yielded no stock price benefit. The negative relationship between excellent employee
relations and stock price 3 years after IPO may result from the fact that investors often view generous
employee relations as costly and excessive slack and thus punish these firms for operating inefficiently
with a lower share price (Jensen, 1993).
Another possibility, however, is that firm survival may be a better indicator of the longer-term and
less proximate benefits that can arise from collective mindfulness and the ability to manage the unex-
pected. Using the full sample of 269 firms we crudely tested whether these HR practices had an impact
on firm survival 3 years after IPO. We used a logistic regression (1¼ firm left the sample, 0 otherwise)
with all the independent and control variables included in Model 3 of Table 2. The results (not
reported) indicate that training significantly reduced the likelihood of exiting the sample (i.e.,
increased the likelihood of ‘survival’). Firms with an emphasis on training and all other variables held
at their mean are 13 per cent more likely to survive than the mean firm (93 per cent versus 80 per cent
survival rate). Skilled temporary employees and positive employee relations had no effect on survival.
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However, these results should be taken as extremely tentative because our measure of firm exit does not
differentiate between bankruptcy, merger/acquisition, delisting, or going private. It is likely that each
of these forms of exit occurs under qualitatively different circumstances. Even with the significant
impact of an emphasis on training on firm survival, the overall pattern of results still indicates that
HR practices have their strongest impact on more proximate outcomes like innovation.
This study has significant implications for work in the areas of high reliability and collective mind-
fulness as it suggests two potential boundary conditions and future research directions. We argued that
HR practices work through mindfulness and our findings suggest the beginnings of taxonomy of ordin-
ary HR practices that may enable and shape mindful processing. Future work should explore additional
practices and enabling conditions of mindfulness. Our results, when coupled with prior work on HROs,
also suggest an interesting boundary condition for collective mindfulness—size. The majority of the
firms in the sample had fewer than 200 employees, allowing them to operate much more like an oper-
ating unit (e.g., an aircraft carrier flight deck, an air traffic control tower) than a large firm. Future work
will need to untangle under what conditions collective mindfulness is beneficial for an entire organiza-
tion. That is, do all parts of the organization need to engage in mindful processing at all times? In a
small entrepreneurial venture where errors of omission are frequently fatal, the answer is likely ‘yes,’
but in an organization with substantial slack, mindfulness could be utilized on an exception basis.
Furthermore, collective mindfulness might only need to be present in ‘core’ areas (especially when
the outcome of interest is at the operating level, be it innovation or safe operations)—which may
explain why it seems to be (and needs to be) omnipresent in operations-centric organizations such
as air traffic control, nuclear power operations, and nuclear aircraft carriers.
Our findings and theorizing also suggest several possible refinements for the strategic human
resource management literature. First, the findings suggest a more parsimonious and theoretically dri-
ven set of mechanisms for achieving greater intensity of innovation as opposed to long lists of practices
that characterize many strategic human resource management studies (e.g., Huselid, 1995). The value
of parsimony is enhanced in dynamic environments because discontinuous change and unclear cause–
effect relationships make a mindful approach more tenable than attempting fit because the complexity
of these environments precludes sufficient knowledge to accurately fit an environment at a given
moment. In such environments, fit may even be maladaptive as it generates conditions of tight cou-
pling, which preclude adaptability (Becker & Gerhart, 1996).
Second, our results suggest that the HR practices that contribute to performance do not apply in all
contexts and may vary across sector or industry. For example, in the petrochemical (Kochan et al.,
1992), mining, and construction (Rousseau & Libuser, 1997) industries, using temporary employees
significantly diminished reliability and performance, but this same practice significantly enhanced the
number of innovations produced by the firms in our sample. This suggests the need for a multi-industry
study that explores in more depth when and how different HR practices are relevant for mindfulness,
reliability, and performance.
Third, the results suggest an alternate set of mechanisms for unpacking the HR practice–firm per-
formance relationship. Prior research has emphasized the role of discretionary effort (e.g., MacDuffie,
1995). In contrast, based on the results of this study we suggest that HR practices that foster intimate
knowledge (reluctance to simplify), situational awareness (information sharing and sensitivity to
operations), and recovery skills (resilience) should promote innovation and performance.3 The pro-
cesses encouraged by HR practices may also mediate their relationship with firm performance and
merits further investigation. Lastly, HR practices seem to have their greatest impact on more proximate
measures of firm performance (i.e., innovation) as opposed to more distant financial measures such as
stock price. This finding is consistent with previous studies that found a strong relationship between
3We thank Karl Weick for suggesting this argument.
898 T. J. VOGUS AND T. M. WELBOURNE
Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. J. Organiz. Behav. 24, 877–903 (2003)
HR practices and operating performance in manufacturing (Ichniowski et al., 1997; MacDuffie, 1995)
and that failed to find a similarly strong relationship between HR policies and stock price (Welbourne
& Andrews, 1996; Hannon & Milkovich, 1996).
Limitations
The findings of this study must be considered in light of its limitations. First, because our study con-
sisted of one industry, the results of this study may be idiosyncratic to IPO software firms and, there-
fore, not generalizable. We attempted to ameliorate the generalizability issue by theorizing that firms
become reliability seeking based on the extent to which their environments are interactively complex
and tightly coupled. Our theoretical analysis suggests that IPO software firms meet these criteria. A
wider array of organizations may also meet these criteria as interconnected technologies and resource
demands move many organizations toward a more tightly coupled and interactively complex state
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Thus, to the extent that an industry or firm faces a similarly unforgiving
environment, a wider variety of firms may be reliability seeking and the processes of collective mind-
fulness should apply.
Second, while our use of the zero-inflated Poisson is appropriate given the fact that some firms may
never attempt to patent, it also circumscribes the generalizability of our findings. We have acknowl-
edged this limitation by discussing our results as only holding for firms at risk of patenting (i.e., not
structurally zero). However, this limitation remains potentially problematic to the extent that innova-
tive firms do not patent. If innovative firms do not patent then our results cannot be read as supporting a
relationship between HR practices and innovation generally, but only between HR practices and
patents. While we cannot definitively determine whether there are sufficient innovative firms that do
not patent to bias our results, we believe this is not the case. First, data from the Software Encyclopedia
(1999), which summarizes industry analyst reviews of ‘most innovative’ and ‘best software applica-
tions,’ indicates that the firms with the highest patent counts (e.g., Netscape Communications, i2, and
Macromedia) were also ranked as most innovative. Furthermore, prior empirical work by Flood et al.
(1997) found that for a sample of high-technology firms patenting significantly correlated with inno-
vative ‘pioneering’ behavior (i.e., the capacity of the firm to develop new products ahead of rivals).
A third limitation of this study is sample selection bias and survivor bias. By studying IPO firms, we
exclude software firms that choose not to go public (e.g., the SAS Institute) as well as firms that may
cease operations prior to undertaking an IPO. This problem is further exacerbated by survivor bias
because older firms and smaller firms (both significant at p< 0.001) are more likely to be excluded from
the analysis due to a merger/acquisition, delisting, or bankruptcy prior to 3 years after IPO. The survivor
bias is a result of implementing a panel design, which regresses firm outcomes at t3 on firm variables at
t0. While both of these issues are problematic, they are outweighed by the fact that the panel design
allows us to adequately test our hypotheses. Most importantly, a cross-sectional design would not allow
us to observe the intensity of innovation over a meaningful period of time (i.e., 3 years).
Lastly, we utilized binary indicators for our HR practices and the exact processes of collective mind-
fulness remain unmeasured. While our limited qualitative data and the extant literature provides sug-
gestive support for our theorizing of underlying processes, only a handful of the firms in our sample
make an even marginally detailed statement regarding the content of their practices. Thus, our mea-
sures still suffer from the fact that they do not directly correspond to the theoretical processes posited.
Ideally, we would have more exact measures of both HR practices and mindful processes to better
assess the form of the relationships between these constructs. Therefore, the results should serve as
a foundation for grounded fieldwork or surveys that more explicitly and extensively examines the pro-
cesses of collective mindfulness as well as the relationship between HR practices and mindfulness.
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Conclusion
HROs have long been viewed as ‘too exotic’ to offer insight into high performance in other organiza-
tions (Scott, 1994). We have challenged this view and asserted that while ordinary organizations may
not operate high-hazard technologies, they may face the same conditions of tight coupling and inter-
active complexity when interacting with their external environments. Thus, even ordinary organiza-
tions may be reliability seeking. The results of this study indicate that three HR practices (the use
of skilled temporary employees, positive employee relations, and an emphasis on training) help a sub-
set of reliability-seeking organizations (IPO software firms) achieve innovation. While we indirectly
test the processes of collective mindfulness, our findings suggest its structural underpinnings. Given
the results of this study, this merits additional attention. Future research should use both HR practices
and the collective mindfulness framework to study an even wider variety of settings to better assess the
relationships between structures and processes as well as the scope and boundary conditions of
mindfulness.
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